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This research examines whether audit committees characteristics are associated with an 
improved financial reporting quality. The sample of the study is the Nigerian listed 
companies for the year ended 2010. Data was gathered from annual reports and 
SBAInteractive. Findings show that there was a weak association between the 
characteristics of audit committee and improved financial reporting quality. The audit 
committee independence and expertise are found to significantly associate with improved 
financial reporting quality. Audit committee meets 4 to 5 times a year and audit committee 
size consists of 4 members. The result also shows that 70% of the sample firms employed 
Non-Big 4 auditors. These findings provide evidence on the mandatory audit committee 
requirement under the NSE listing rules on how the companies respond towards The Code.   
 





Corporate failures in Nigeria have raised great concern in the development of corporate 
businesses. In the banking sector alone, 45 banks were liquidated in between 1994 to 2006, 
while in 2007, 14 banks were liquidated. There was also a case on the falsification of 
company financial statements in Cadbury Nigerian Public Listed Companies in 2006. Public 
corporations such as Nigerian Telecommunications Plc (NITEL), Nigerian National Shipping 
Line (NNSL), National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) and Nigeria Railway Corporation 
(NRC) were either dead or simply drain pipes of public resources (Olusa, 2007). 
 
In 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has sacked the managing directors and Chief 
Executives Officers (CEOs) of five commercial banks along with their executive directors. 
Forty eight days later, precisely on October 2, 2009, the Central Bank of Nigeria announced 
an additional sack of three bank CEOs and their respective board of directors all due to 
excessive high level of non-performing loans, which was attributable to poor corporate 
governance practices, lack of credit administration process, the unethical practices by the 
management and the bank credit risk management practices (Economic Confidential, 2009). 
As a of these and other scandals recorded in Nigeria in recent times, international 
organizations, financial regulatory authorities and academicians  became much concerned 
about corporate governance issues in Nigeria.  
 
In Nigeria for instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in collaboration with 
the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) inaugurated 17 committee members to identify the 
weaknesses in the corporate governance practices and suggest changes for improvement. 
The SEC Code of Governance (2003) in Nigeria requires that all listed companies should 
establish an audit committee with the key objective of raising standards of corporate 
governance and it goes further to state that audit committees should be established in 
accordance with Companies and Allied Matters Act(CAMA) Section 359 (3&4). These high 
profile corporate collapses in Nigeria have created a considerable concern among investors 
and financial regulators about the quality of company financial reporting practices. Thus, this 
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research intends to examine the audit committee characteristics and their effect on the 
financial reporting quality.  
 
In terms of significance of the study, this study wills contribute to the literatures on audit 
committees and financial reporting quality. Further the findings might be useful to regulators 
of Nigeria capital market in increasing the effectiveness of the audit committee listing rules. 
Hopefully, this finding would give a better picture on the compliance level of Nigerian Stock 
Exchange operators towards the rules. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Financial reporting quality 
Financial reporting has been a principal means of communicating financial information to 
outside users (Johnson, Khurana and Reynalds, 2002). Prior studies have shown the 
usefulness of financial statements to the market participants (Cheung and Sami, 2000), have 
shown that market react positively to favourable earnings and negatively to unfavourable 
earnings in the financial statements. Besides the markets, the users of financial information 
include customers, supplies, government, creditors, employees, competitors, and investment 
analysts (Atrill and Mclaney, 2001). Since the financial reports are prepared to meet the 
varying needs of all interested parties. Atrill and Mclaney (2001) outlines certain key 
characteristics that should be meet by the financial reporting in order to meet the needs of 
users which are identified as understandability, comparability, reliability, relevance and 
timeliness. 
 
Jonas and Blanchet (2000) describe two general perspective widely used in assessing the 
quality of financial reporting. The first perspective is based on the needs of the users. Under 
this perspective, financial reporting quality is determined relative to the usefulness of the 
financial information to the users of information. General purpose financial reporting states 
that the primary objective of financial reporting is to “provide information to users that is 
useful for making and evaluating decisions about allocation of scarce resources” (CPA, 
Australia, 2006, p.15, cited by Baxter, 2007). The AASB framework explains the qualitative 
characteristics that make financial reporting information useful to users. These are 
understandability, relevance, reliability, and comparability of the information (CPA Australia, 
2006). The second perspective of financial reporting quality is focused on the notion of 
shareholders/investors protection. This perspective defines quality of financial reporting as 
“full and transparent financial information that is not designed to mislead users” (Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000, p.357, cited by Baxter, 2007). There is a fundamental distinction between 
these two perspectives of financial reporting quality. The user’s needs perspective is mainly 
concerned with providing relevant information to users for making decisions. Whereas the 
shareholder/investor protection perspective aims to ensure the information provided to users 
is sufficient for their needs, transparent and competent (Jonas and Blanchet, 2000, cited by 
Baxter, 2007).  
 
2.2 Audit committee characteristics  
Previous studies concerning corporate governance and financial reporting quality had focus 
on board characteristics rather than audit committee characteristics. Beasley (1996) finds 
that firms committing financial statement frauds have a significant lower percentage of 
outside directors than comparable firms not committing financial statement frauds. Other 
researchers have investigated the impact of having audit committee on financial reporting 
quality. Pincus, Rubarsky and Wong (1989) show that before audit committees were form 
larger firms with Big 8 auditor and firms with greater proportion of outside directors were 
more likely to form audit committees. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) find evidence that 
firms committing financial frauds are less likely to have audit committees at the time of the 
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fraud than other firms without audit committees. While these studies show that the existence 
of an audit committee impacts on financial reporting quality. Dezoort et al. (2002) identified 
several characteristics that contributed to the effectiveness of the audit committee. These 
section overviews the prior research on these characteristics. 
 
2.3 Audit committee independence 
The benefit of having independent chair of audit committee shows mixed results. Prior 
studies have found that it is easier for an audit committee that has no ties to management to 
critically evaluate their work (Abbott, et al., 2003). The presence of independent audit 
committee reduces the likelihood of earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004). McMullen 
and Raghunandan, (1996) examined companies that experience reporting problems and find 
that those are much less likely to have fully independent audit committee. 
 
However, other studies report no evidence of relationship between the audit committee 
having all independent members and the occurrence of earnings restatement (Lin et al., 
2006). Further studies that find no significant influence of independence of audit committee 
members and financial reporting (Broson et al., 2006; Kent and Stewart, 2008). However, 
the former does not find a positive relationship when examining the independence of the 
chair of audit committee irrespective of the independence of the rest of the committee 
members. This lead to the second hypothesis; 
 
H1: The independence of an audit committee is associated with financial reporting quality. 
 
2.4 Audit committee size 
Size is one of the audit committee characteristics that is investigated in many prior research. 
Larger committees are commonly expected to be more effective. Lin et al. (2006) find that 
companies with audit committee consisting of at least four members are less likely to 
experience earnings restatements. Felo et al. (2003) report that larger audit committee 
increases financial reporting quality as measured by analyst’s scores. 
 
Research to date find mixed results as to whether size really matters. Xie et al. (2001) find 
weak relationship between audit committee size and earnings management. Furthermore, 
Abbott et al. (2004) find no evidence of an association between audit committee size and 
earnings restatements. Given the mixed results from the previous studies lead to the 
formulation of the following hypothesis:  
 
H2: The size of an audit committee is associated with financial reporting quality.  
 
2.5 Audit committee expertise 
Nigeria Code of Corporate Governance requires that at least one member of the audit 
committee have an accounting, finance or industry expertise. Such an audit committee 
member has been found to be in a better position to monitor internal controls and to 
understand the various financial and operational issues that can arise (Zhang et al., 2007). 
Additionally it has been shown that audit committee members with financial reporting 
knowledge are more likely to understand external auditor judgment (Dezort and Salterio, 
2001). Furthermore, audit committee that have financial experts have greater interaction with 
their internal auditors (Raghunandan et al., 2001) and less associated with the occurrence of 
internal control problems (Krishnan, 2005). However, Yang and Krishnan (2005), and Lin et 
al. (2006) fail to find any significant association between financial experts and financial 
reporting quality measured as the level of earnings managements. For this the following 
hypothesis has been developed: 
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H3: The expertise of an audit committee member is associated with financial reporting 
quality. 
 
2.6 Audit committee meetings 
Empirical evidence on the impact of the frequency of audit committee meetings on the level 
of financial reporting quality is n mixed. Bryan et al. (2004) found that audit committees that 
meet regularly improve transparency of reported earnings and therefore enhance earnings 
quality. When audit committee meets more often the level of disclosure increases (Bronson 
et al., 2006). While the chance of restatements or reporting problems decreases (Abbott et 
al., 2004). However, Vafeas (2005) finds a negative relationship between the number of 
audit committee meetings and earning management. He et al. (2007) find no evidence of a 
significant relationship between the number of audit committee meetings frequency and 
earnings management. Other studies that fail to find a significant relation between audit 
committee meeting frequency and earnings management are (Yang and Krishnan, 2005; 
Davidson et al., 2004). To further examine the impact of audit committee meeting frequency 
on financial reporting quality this study tests the following hypothesis:  
 
H4: The meeting frequency of an audit committee is associated with an increased financial 
reporting quality. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Population and sample selection 
The population from which the sample was drawn was 202 companies listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) with financial year ending 2010 was chosen as the base year for the 
collection of necessary data for measuring the audit committee characteristics. Data for 
financial years ending 2009 and 2011 was also required to measure the earnings quality 
based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The study used an archival data in the form 
of company annual reports and SBAinteractive.com. Sample selection procedure and final 
sample are shown in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Summary of sample selection 
Item Frequency  
NSE Listed Companies 202 
Less:  
Banks and foreign companies 34 
Insurance and Mortgage companies                                              43 
Companies that annual report are not available                             55 
Final sample 70 
 
Based on the data collection, 55 companies were excluded because the annual reports data 
for 2011 were not available due to time variation in the financial year. Also 34 banks and 
foreign companies are also excluded because financial reporting requirements for these 
companies differ from companies listed on the NSE. For insurance and mortgage 
companies, 43 companies were excluded because they do not generate sales revenue 
which is needed to calculate our earning quality variables. The final sample size of 70 
companies was available for testing the hypotheses between audit committee formation and 
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Table 2: Sample composition by industry group 
Industry group Number Percentages 
Household’s durables 
Health care and pharmaceuticals 
Information telecommunication technology 
Building materials 
Packaging and containers 
Printing and publishing 
Hotels and hospitality 
































Total 70 100 
 
3.2 Regression models  
The dependent variable (earnings quality) is based on the accrual estimation error model 
developed in Dechew and Dichev (2002). The EQDD was estimated based on the following 
regression: 
 
ΔW   =   +                                                                            
 (1)                                                                    
                                                                                                         
Where by: 
 
ΔW   = Δ Working capital year t, i.e. Δ Accounts receivables + Δ Inventory – Δ 
Accounts payable - Δ Taxes payable + Δ Other assets (net) 
       = Cash flows from operations in year t – 1 
      = Cash flow from operations in year t 
       = Cash flows from operations in year t + 1 
         = Sales in year t less sales in year t -1; 
     = Gross property, plants and equipment in year t 
 
The following equation model is used for audit committee characteristics and financial 
reporting quality.  
 
EQDD =          +                                          
                                                                                                                                     
(2) 
 
3.3 Measurement of variables 
 
Table 3: Measurement of variables 
 Variable name Variable measurement 
Dependent 
Variable 
EQDD Δ Working capital year t, i.e. Δ Accounts receivables 
+ Δ Inventory – Δ Accounts payable -  Δ Taxes 





Existence of an independent chair 
 AC Expertise The proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting or financial qualification 
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 AC Meetings The number of audit committee meetings held during 
the year 




Auditor type 1 = a company auditor was Big 4 and 0 otherwise  
 Leverage The ratio of total assets to total liabilities  
 Firm size The natural log of total assets  
    
4. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for audit committee characteristics and financial reporting 
quality 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std. Dev. 
EQDD 2.19 2.52 2.79 3.18 6.74 
ACIND 0.84 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.37 
ACEXP 0.51 0.50 0.20 0.80 0.42 
ACSIZE 5.08 6.00 4.00 6.00 1.00 
ACMEET 3.74 4.00 2.0 4.00 0.56 
LEV 0.5 0.48 0.25 0.94 0.13 
AUDTYPE 0.70 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.46 
FIRMSIZE 2.3 7.47 2.7 1.50 3.62 
 
Table 4 reveals that 84% of the firms have an independent audit committee chair. On the 
average 51% of the audit committee members were accounting or financial experts. Result 
found that the average size of the audit committee members to be 5 members and meet at 
least 4 times a year. This study also shows that 70% of the sample firms employ Non-Big 4 
audit firms. 
 
Table 5: Correlation coefficients 
 EQDD AC_IND AC_EXP AC_SIZE AC_MEET TYPE_AUD FIRM_SIZE LEV 
EQDD 1.0000 -0.3184 -0.0449 -0.2460 -0.0858 -0.2082 -0.6769 0.0695 
AC_IND  1.0000 -0.0788 0.1553 -0.0589 0.0600 0.2422 0.0318 
AC_EXP   1.0000 0.0039 0.0281 0.2301 0.1024 0.1784 
AC_SIZE    1.0000 0.4552 0.2753 0.3700 0.0827 
AC_MEET     1.0000 0.3724 0.1779 0.0395 
TYPE_AUD      1.0000 0.3033 0.1070 
FIRM_SIZE       1.0000 0.0001 
LEV        1.0000 
 
With reference to Table 5, findings show evidence on the relationship between audit 
committee characteristics and financial reporting quality. The results indicate that EQDD is 
positively correlated with ACIND, ACEXP, ACSIZE, and ACMEET. Finding indicates that this 
measure of earning quality is higher when there are greater proportion of audit committee 
members with accounting expertise, independent audit committee chair, at least minimum of 
4 audit committee members and hold 4 meeting during the year. The result for control 
variables indicate significant positive association between EQDD and firm size and auditor 
type as well as negatively insignificant association with leverage.  
 
Table 6 explains that the audit committee independence show a significant relationship 
between audit committee independence and earning quality at 1% level. This finding is 
consistent with the finding by Beasley (2000) that audit committee independence is 
significantly related to financial reporting quality. 
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Table 6: Regression for audit committee characteristics and earning quality 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const 2.53907e+07 1.76279e+06 14.4038 <0.00001*** 
AC_IND -1.86098e+06 438163 -4.2472 0.00007*** 
AC_EXP 1.32533e+06 723538 1.8317 0.07180* 
AC_SIZE 29542.6 127981 0.2308 0.81820 
AC_MEET -89611.4 404043 -0.2218 0.82521 
TYPE_AUD -396596 242903 -1.6327 0.10759 
FIRM_SIZE -0.142373 0.009666 -14.7292 <0.00001*** 
LEV 3.52692e+06 1.05207e+06 3.3524 0.00137*** 
R-squared  0.857693    
 
The relationship between audit committee members with accounting or financial back and 
earning quality is found to be significant at 10% in this study. This finding is similar to that of 
Bedard et al. (2004) and Xie et al. (2003). Their studies show that audit committee members 
with accounting or financial backgrounds are effective monitors in reducing earning 
management. However, this finding contradict Yang and Krishnan (2005) and Lin et al. 
(2006) who fail to find any significant association between accounting or financial experts 
and financial reporting quality measured as the level of earning management. 
 
The relationship between audit committee members and meeting frequency is found to be 
insignificant in this study. In this regard, the finding is similar to Vafes (2005) and Lin et al. 
(2006) who found no relationship between the numbers of audit committee meetings and 
financial reporting quality. This finding is in contrast to what Zhang et al. (2007) and Xie et al. 
(2003) findings. Similarly, this study also found no significant relationship between audit 
committee size and financial reporting quality. Among the control variables, firm size and 
leverage are found to be associated with financial reporting quality. This finding are 
consistent with those found by Xie et al. (2003), and Yang and Krishnan (2005) who reported 
that firm size is significantly related to earning quality. This study uses the following 
regression model to test our second hypothesis that financial reporting quality is associated 
with audit committee independence, expertise, size and meeting frequency. EQ denotes 
earning quality measures. This model is estimated on our sample of listed Nigerian 




In the last decade the world have witness a lot of corporate scandals involving accounting 
manipulations, and thus the issue of corporate governance has become prominent among 
researchers, regulators, and practitioners. As such the situation has pushed many countries 
to involve in series of reforms to improve the way in which corporations are managed and 
governed. Consequently, a series of recommendations and best practices of corporate 
governance has been suggested and mandated worldwide. Following the practices of 
different countries, Nigeria was involved recently in 2003 and issue guidelines on corporate 
governance best practices and required all listed companies on the NSE to comply with such 
practices. 
 
Findings from this work show that there was a significant association between audit 
committee independence and financial reporting quality. Also, a significant positive 
association was found between members of audit committee having accounting and financial 
expertise and financial reporting quality. However, this study fails to find any significant 
association between audit committee meeting frequency and audit committee size with 
financial reporting quality.     
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